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Transmission of Mastery 
JAMES A. GARDNER† 
ABSTRACT 
James A. Garfield, speaking of the legendary professor 
and longtime president of Williams College, Mark Hopkins, 
reputedly remarked, “The ideal college is Mark Hopkins on 
one end of a log and a student on the other.” This 
longstanding ideal—a highly talented teacher deeply 
engaged with a student—has been eclipsed in our time by a 
bureaucratic conception of education characterized by 
prescriptive curricula; standardized constraints on teacher 
discretion, such as rubrics; and continual assessment, not 
only of students but of professors, no matter how talented. In 
this paper, I defend the “Mark Hopkins model” as the only 
conceivable way to produce the transmission of mastery from 
master to novice.  
 
†Bridget and Thomas Black SUNY Distinguished Professor of Law and Research 
Professor of Political Science, University at Buffalo Law School, The State 
University of New York. This paper was written for a conference in honor of my 
colleague Jack Schlegel, entitled “Serious Fun: A Conference around and with 
Schlegel!” In my thirty years in the academy, I have never encountered a more 
thoughtful and engaged interlocutor on the subject of teaching. The ideas 
presented here were inspired by a two-decade, ongoing conversation with 
Schlegel, and I offer this paper with humble gratitude, in honor of those 
conversations. I also thank my colleague Bert Westbrook, who organized the 
conference, for providing me the opportunity to reflect at length on the subject. I 
additionally thank Herb Gardner, Jane Gardner, and Jay Mootz for comments on 
an earlier draft, and Dan Caves for valuable research assistance. 
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To do so, I make the following claims: (1) only masters 
are capable of judging mastery; (2) masters are those and 
only those who either are acknowledged as masters by other 
masters or who self-claim mastery; (3) virtually nothing can 
be said a priori about the content of mastery in any domain, 
nor can its content be fully articulated, even by masters; (4) 
the only way to transmit mastery is via the teaching of a 
master, and which methods of doing so most effectively 
cannot be determined a priori; (5) masterful teaching 
involves discarding preconceived lesson plans as often as it 
does sticking to them; (6) the variability of assessment from 
master to master or even by a single master assessing the 
same or different students at different times does not in any 
way impugn the validity of their judgments; (7) the most 
reliable method of evaluating mastery consists of the 
consensus of multiple masters expressed over a period of 
time in a transcript; (8) the essence of masterful teaching 
consists of the perpetually repeated deployment of trial and 
error, meaning that the content and methods of successful 
transmission of mastery can never be prescribed in advance; 
(9) there is no such thing as mastery of “teaching,” tout court; 
there is only mastery of teaching something; and (10) the 
modern move toward prescription and assessment results 
not from the discovery of better and more reliable ways of 
transmitting mastery, but from the abandonment altogether 
of transmitting mastery as a goal of education; its actual goal 
has become the mass reproduction of basic competence. 
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“The ideal college is Mark Hopkins on one end of a log 
and a student on the other.” 
—   James A. Garfield, speaking of the legendary 
professor and longtime president (1836-1872) of 
Williams College1 
“The dean and the faculty of a law school shall conduct 
ongoing evaluation of the law school’s program of legal 
education, learning outcomes, and assessment 
methods; and shall use the results of this evaluation 
to determine the degree of student attainment of 
competency in the learning outcomes and to make 
appropriate changes to improve the curriculum.” 
—  American Bar Association Law School 
Accreditation Standard 315 
MASTERY 
1 
Here is my claim: “I am an outstanding lawyer.” 
Am I not?  
Well? I’m waiting. 
2 
Who is capable of evaluating such a claim? Clearly, only 
an outstanding lawyer can evaluate this claim—a master of 
the practice of lawyering. By definition, only a master is 
capable of judging mastery.  
  
 
 1. FREDERICK RUDOLPH, MARK HOPKINS AND THE LOG: WILLIAMS COLLEGE, 
1836-1872 vii (1956). In another version of the story, Garfield said: “A pine bench 
with Mark Hopkins at one end of it and me at the other is a good enough college.” 
LEVERETT WILSON SPRING, A HISTORY OF WILLIAMS COLLEGE 210 (1917); see also 
id. at 211, n.1. The version with the log appears to have passed into the general 
lore. RUDOLPH, supra, at vii-viii. 
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Might another high-performing professional—a doctor, 
say—be able to judge the mastery of a lawyer? No. Some 
years ago, I saw an oral surgeon. While the surgeon was 
examining me, he admired the work of my dentist—”She 
does good work, doesn’t she?,” he said. I mumbled, “Yes, she 
does,” but I knew very well I had no way of judging the 
validity of his claim, though it was very nice indeed to hear 
this validation from another practitioner of oral medicine.  
Can a client judge the mastery of his own lawyer? No. 
Clients may develop hunches, but without legal training, 
they lack the ability to evaluate the quality of the legal work 
they purchase. This is precisely why clients are not 
permitted to direct the legal and tactical decisions of 
lawyers.2 
Can a well-informed student—a senior apprentice, say—
judge mastery? No. Such a person may be able to distinguish 
competence from incompetence, and may even be able to 
distinguish among degrees of moderate competence, but 
because his understanding of the practice to which he is 
apprenticed is by definition incomplete, he is not in a position 
to distinguish mastery from mere competence.  
What about an experienced practitioner who, despite his 
experience, nevertheless lacks mastery? Although his 
opinion is not uninformed, he too is in no position to judge 
the mastery of others. A useful piece of social science 
research, known as the Dunning-Kruger Effect, has 
demonstrated the obvious: people of low competence, because 
they are unable to perceive the performative difference 
between competence and incompetence, cannot even perceive 
their own incompetence, and thus frequently judge 
themselves to be far more competent than they are.3 This 
 
 2. Model Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.2(a) cmt. 2 (Am. Bar. Ass’n 1983); N.Y. 
Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.2(e) (2009). 
 3. David Dunning, et al., Why People Fail to Recognize Their Own 
Incompetence, 12 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCH. SCI. 83 (2003); David Dunning, 
The Dunning-Kruger Effect: On Being Ignorant of One’s Own Ignorance, in 44 
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 247 (2011). 
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disqualifies them from perceiving competence in others, 
much less mastery. 
3 
If only masters can judge mastery, who, then, is a 
master? There are two and only two possibilities: (1) those so 
acknowledged by other masters; and (2) self-proclaimed 
masters.  
In our society, we have to a great extent institutionalized 
the identification of mastery through the creation and 
distribution of formal trappings of acknowledgment: degrees, 
certificates, testimonials, inductions into guilds, and so forth. 
Whether such methods in fact successfully identify true 
masters is a question I shall set aside here. But even 
assuming these modes of acknowledgment are accurate, they 
do not exhaust the universe of possibilities because 
individuals who lack the formal trappings of 
acknowledgment may also claim mastery. 
A dozen years ago, The New Yorker published an 
illuminating account of how a system of self-proclaimed 
masters may operate in practice.4 In the early 2000s, 
automobiles were relatively scarce in China, yet with only 
three percent of the world’s autos, China accounted for more 
than twenty percent of its accidents. In this “nation of new 
drivers,”5 understanding of safe driving practices was scarce, 
and eventually, the Chinese government began to require 
driver training as a condition of licensure. 
This suggests a high degree of standardization, but much depends 
on the instructor, who is called a jiaolian, or “coach.” Often, coaches 
have developed their own theories and regimens, like the martial-
arts masters of old. Wei Ziqi’s coach . . . forced his students to begin  
  
 
 4. Peter Hessler, Wheels of Fortune: The People’s Republic Learns to Drive, 
THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 19, 2007, at 104. 
 5. Id. at 108. 
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every maneuver in second gear. It was more challenging, he said; 
first gear would only make them lazy.6 
In one driving dojo,  
[t]he students spent ten days on the parking range, and during that 
time they performed exactly three movements: a ninety-degree turn 
into a parking spot, the same maneuver in reverse, and parallel 
parking. Every day, for as many as six hours, they practiced these 
turns over and over. Like any good martial-arts master, Coach Tang 
was strict. “You must have forgotten your brain today!” he yelled, 
when a student brushed against a pole. “Don’t hold the gearshift 
loosely like that!” he shouted at another. “If you do, your father will 
curse you!”7 
In the school of another driving jiaolian, the students’ final 
challenge was  
the “single-plank bridge”—a concrete riser, a foot high and only 
slightly wider than a tire. Students had to aim the car perfectly, so 
that two wheels perched atop the riser . . . . If a single wheel slipped, 
they failed the exam. The students spent most of their ten days 
practicing the single-plank bridge, and I asked a coach why it was 
so important. “Because it’s very difficult,” he said.8 
Systems of mastery by self-proclamation also exist in the 
United States. Masters of philately and numismatics 
generally self-proclaim, as do masters of horse-breeding, hair 
styling, and cosmetology, though sometimes these 
occupations require a license, a form of official validation of 
competence, though perhaps not of mastery. Self-taught 
amateurs sometimes proclaim themselves masters—in the 
field of history, for example—without the advanced study 
and formal trappings of consensus recognition, though of 
course such recognition may be, and sometimes is obtained 
informally, through testimonials of recognized masters. 
But regardless of whether mastery is acknowledged by 
consensus or self-proclaimed, the status of master may be 
obtained exclusively through a process that is circular and 
 
 6. Id. at 110–11. 
 7. Id. at 111. 
 8. Id. at 112. 
2021] TRANSMISSION OF MASTERY 61 
self-referential: because only masters are capable of judging 
mastery, the population of masters may be identified only by 
masters themselves. The insularity of this process 
sometimes creates, understandably enough, a degree of 
discomfort and suspicion among outsiders to the practice, a 
subject to which I will return. 
4 
Of what, then, does mastery consist? Surprisingly little 
can be said. 
First, mastery is domain specific. There is no such thing 
as “mastery” tout court; there is only mastery of a specific 
domain. Consequently, generalizations about mastery are 
possible only at a level of abstraction so high as to be useless, 
if not indeed entirely circular—something on the order of “a 
master is one who has mastered the elements of his practice,” 
for example. 
Second, mastery itself is highly variable. Even within a 
single domain, there is no fixed set of attributes that 
comprise mastery. Rather, mastery is more like a portfolio of 
knowledge, skills, and attributes that may be held in 
different combinations, provided that the total value of the 
portfolio, so to speak, surpasses some threshold. As a result, 
the content of mastery can differ from master to master, and 
may even be contested among masters who hold different 
kinds of portfolios, or who simply hold different conceptions 
of the practice of which they are acknowledged to be masters. 
Third, mastery is a continuous journey, not a 
destination. As a master’s mastery increases, the content of 
his mastery necessarily changes and evolves. Moreover, 
masters, like other humans, change over time. Insight may 
arrive, even to masters, at any time. My own belief is that 
insight arrives whenever a person adventitiously becomes 
ready to receive it, and that different kinds of insight thus 
arrive at different chronological ages, and following the 
accumulation of different kinds of life experiences. Yet a late-
arriving insight does not impugn the truth or value of earlier-
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arriving insights; it merely underscores the fundamental 
fluidity of mastery, which is, after all, a human condition. 
Fourth, mastery is by definition contextually responsive, 
so what counts as a masterful performance may change over 
time, as external conditions change. I have taught 
Constitutional Law for thirty years, and in that course I 
always try to teach my students how to construct and deliver 
good constitutional arguments. But what counted as good 
constitutional advocacy when I started, in the age of 
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, no longer counted as 
good advocacy later, in the age of Rehnquist, Scalia, and 
Thomas, much less in the age of Roberts, Gorsuch, and 
Kavanaugh. Thus, the content and methods of masterful 
constitutional argument evolve, as does mastery of the art of 
constitutional advocacy. 
5 
Still, even if the content of mastery changes over time, 
within a given period can its content nevertheless be 
captured and catalogued in a book or a manual, perhaps? No. 
For all the reasons just mentioned, the content of 
mastery is (i) variable, (ii) continually evolving, and (iii) 
contextual. These considerations erect significant and 
perhaps decisive obstacles to the full capture of mastery even 
in a snapshot valid only during the period in which it is 
taken. 
More importantly, it seems to me that at any given 
moment not even a master himself is capable of articulating 
fully the content of his own mastery, even if he were inclined 
to do so. First, not even the most experienced master has 
encountered all possible problems and challenges, and so 
does not yet know the masterful response to these as-yet 
unencountered circumstances, even though he is likely 
capable of handling them masterfully should they arise. This 
helps explain a common aspect of the phenomenology of 
mastery: masters tend to be keenly aware of how little they 
know.  
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Second and more fundamentally, the master does not 
know everything he knows, or at least is unable to articulate 
it using the language of the mastered domain.9 For many 
years, I taught pretrial federal civil litigation. In that class, 
I required my students to develop legal arguments and write 
them in the form of briefs. Usually, students would make 
sound arguments, but occasionally, a student would make an 
argument that was frivolous, and thus forbidden under rules 
of professional ethics—a serious violation. When I would 
inform students that their arguments were frivolous, they 
often replied, with complete sincerity, “But it seems like a 
good argument to me.” I always found these moments 
uncomfortable because it is impossible to explain 
meaningfully to a student who doesn’t already see the 
frivolity of his argument why and in precisely what way it 
crosses the line from legitimate to frivolous. “Trust me,” was 
about all I could say; “it’s a matter of professional judgment; 
no judge would ever accept that argument.” “But why not?,” 
the student would ask. What possible answer can one make 
to such a question? “When you acquire some experience,” I 
would respond, unhelpfully though truthfully, “you will 
understand why.” 
Finally, to put the matter differently, what does it mean 
for a master to tell a student, “I’ve taught you everything I 
know”? Can we take this literally? Surely not. The master 
does not know when he has truly exhausted his stock of 
knowledge. Such a statement means only that, in the expert 
judgment of the master, more time spent with the master 
will not be as fruitful a use of the student’s time as time spent 
 
 9. It is immaterial to my point, but this may be merely an example of Gödel’s 
Incompleteness Theorem, which holds that no system is capable of fully justifying 
itself. See, e.g., PANU RAATIKAINEN, GÖDEL’S INCOMPLETENESS THEOREMS, THE 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta, ed., Fall Edition 
2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/goedel-incompleteness 
/. Or, for another view of the impossibility of fully articulating knowledge of a 
practice, see Jack Sammons, Confronting the Three Apprenticeships, in TOWARD 
HUMAN FLOURISHING: CHARACTER, PRACTICAL WISDOM, AND PROFESSIONAL 
FORMATION (Mark L. Jones, et al., eds., 2013). 
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practicing in the domain studied. In these circumstances, the 
master cannot know precisely what the student will learn in 
practice. Instead, he merely relies on the knowledge that 
novices may learn things in ways other than from a master’s 
instruction, and the master does not know in any individual 
case what these things are, or perhaps he would teach them 
himself. 
6 
Although the content of mastery is impossible fully to 
articulate, we can nevertheless say this much: mastery is—
indeed, must be—something distinct from what I shall call 
“basic competence.” Consider again the example of teaching 
driving. Formula One race drivers and professional stunt 
drivers do not teach driving to 16-year-olds. If they teach 
driving at all, presumably they teach race and stunt driving. 
This suggests that those who teach driving to teenagers in 
the United States are not themselves masters of the practice 
of driving. Nevertheless, they are good enough for the 
purpose for which they have been engaged. Evidently, they 
possess basic competence in driving, which is what they 
transmit to their students, and is by definition all they are 
capable of transmitting. I shall return to this issue. 
TRANSMISSION OF MASTERY 
7 
How is mastery transmitted? By the teaching of a 
master, and in no other way. 
Is it possible for mastery to be taught by a non-master? 
No, by definition. Non-masters cannot transmit mastery 
because, lacking mastery themselves, it is not theirs to 
transmit. 
What if the non-master has in his possession a 
curriculum developed by a master, along with, say, a 
“rubric”—a grid or checklist directing a non-master 
instructor what to look for and precisely how to reward it? 
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Such tools can certainly help the novice advance. But can 
they so elevate the game of a non-master that he or she 
becomes able to transmit mastery itself? No. Those who are 
not masters cannot recognize mastery, and those who are 
incapable of recognizing its presence or absence cannot 
therefore inculcate it. Since progress toward the 
achievement of mastery is something that can be judged only 
by a master, the question of how to move any given student 
forward, toward mastery, is something that can be judged 
only by a master, in that moment. 
Modern theories of teaching stress testing,10 but testing 
has no necessary relationship to mastery, except perhaps 
mastery of test-taking. When I was studying for the bar, my 
review materials contained practice bar exams. Once, my 
mother asked if she could take a practice exam. She had 
never studied law, and had no interest in doing so—she was 
an English teacher. She did, however, possess an exceedingly 
sharp mind and a certain genius for taking tests. When she 
took the practice bar exam, without so much as glancing at 
the substantive study materials, she got about half the 
questions right—nearly a passing grade. This did not make 
her a master of legal practice. It did not even demonstrate 
that she knew any law. It did, however, illustrate what all 
law professors know: that the bar exam tests little having to 
do with good lawyering. It tests good test-taking, a practice 
of which my mother was, and remains, a master. 
 I do not wish to disparage tests. Administering a test is 
one way—indeed, a traditional and quite properly respected 
way—in which a master may judge a student’s progress 
toward mastery. But so is simple observation, and especially 
observation over an extended period of time, in different 
conditions that require different tasks and responses. I have 
often found it puzzling that clinicians, who have far more 
meaningful opportunities than any other law faculty to 
observe their students’ actual, professional performance, are 
 
 10. E.g., BARBARA E. WALVOORD, ASSESSMENT CLEAR AND SIMPLE 13 (2004). 
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among the most heavily invested in formal, rigid methods of 
assessment.11 
8 
I have said that mastery can be transmitted only by 
masters. But is it possible to say more? Is it possible to say, 
for example, that mastery can be transmitted by masters, or 
can be transmitted most effectively by masters, only when 
they employ some specific method of instruction—for 
example, only when they employ “formative” rather than 
merely “summative” forms of assessment?12 No. If the 
content of mastery itself cannot be fully captured, then a 
fortiori neither can the conditions or methods of its successful 
transmission.  
9 
This brings us to Mark Hopkins on a log. What is meant 
by holding up this image as the very model—indeed, the 
acme13—of effective pedagogy? 
Nineteenth-century college professors taught principally 
by “[l]ectures, meticulous grading of classroom recitations, 
and memorization.”14 Hopkins was guided by a different 
philosophy. He preferred to “watch the progress of individual 
mind, and awaken interest, and answer objections, and 
 
 11. E.g., Amy L. Ziegler, Developing a System of Evaluation in Clinical Legal 
Teaching, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 575 (1992); José García Añón, How Do We Assess in 
Clinical Legal Education? A Reflection on “Reflective” Learning, 23 INT’L J. 
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC. 48 (2016). 
 12. KAY BURKE, BALANCED ASSESSMENT: FROM FORMATIVE TO SUMMATIVE, 21, 
23 (2010); ROY STUCKEY, ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION 
AND A ROADMAP 236ff (2007); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: 
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 164–67 (2007). 
 13. See RUDOLPH, supra note 1, at vii (Garfield’s remarks “came to be looked 
upon by many as the most satisfactory definition of what an American college 
ought to be”). 
 14. Id. at 52–53. 
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explore tendencies.”15 To accomplish these goals, he varied 
his methods of instruction. He often asked “keen, 
stimulating, instructive questions”16 to generate discussion, 
and—shockingly for his era—sometimes asked students 
what they themselves thought.17 Here is a recollection of one 
of his students a half-century after the fact: 
“‘I rang the bell Senior year at the end of the hour,’” said a member 
of the class of 1862, “and sat near the door in the recitation room 
back of the new chapel and quite on the left of the President. One 
day he turned half about in his chair, looked inquiringly and 
expectantly at me, and asked a question. I have no idea what that 
question was or what answer I gave, but the incident made an 
impression upon me which the intervening years—there are fifty-
three of them—have not obliterated.”18 
Above all, Hopkins’s purpose differed from that of most of his 
contemporaries: “The purpose of it all, the end in view, was 
not primarily to communicate knowledge, but to set his 
students ‘intellectually on fire.’”19  
When I imagine Mark Hopkins on a log, I imagine a 
master of his craft approaching the instructional task with a 
stock of knowledge and experience, and some well-earned 
and carefully formulated ideas about how to proceed, but 
willing, and indeed expecting, to improvise—willing and 
expecting, that is, to tailor both his topics and his methods of 
instruction to the immediate needs of his students, 
diagnosed on the spot. I imagine a teacher not committed in 
advance to any particular curriculum or methodology, but 
 
 15. Id. at 48. 
 16. SPRING, supra note 1, at 225. 
 17. See RUDOLPH, supra note 1, at 50. 
 18. SPRING, supra note 1, at 223–24 (quoting letter of Rev. E.E. Lewis). 
 19. Id. at 223. This approach seems to have come to be well understood as one 
used intuitively by the best teachers. See KEN BAIN, WHAT THE BEST COLLEGE 
TEACHERS DO 99 (2004) (“[T]he best teachers try to create a natural critical 
learning environment; ‘natural’ because students encounter the skills, habits, 
attitudes, and information they are trying to learn embedded in questions and 
tasks they find fascinating—authentic tasks that arouse curiosity and become 
intrinsically interesting.”). 
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committed instead only to deploying whatever curriculum 
and instructional methodology will, in that moment, best 
serve the goal of moving the student a few steps further 
toward mastery—and if not toward mastery, then at least 
toward the development of an internal hunger for mastery, 
which will itself motivate the student to proceed further, 
even outside the presence of the master.  
A “rubric,” on this account—a fixed template for teaching 
a subject—is precisely the definition of bad teaching because 
it represents a rigid and necessarily speculative prediction of 
what will profit a student most at a particular moment in his 
or her path toward mastery. This is not to say that good 
teaching does not require a great deal of preliminary 
groundwork and preparation; clearly, it does. But 
preparation alone will not suffice. The teacher needs to 
teach—not merely to recite, like an automaton—and effective 
teaching often, and perhaps frequently, means throwing out 
the script rather than sticking to it as the actual needs of 
actual students come gradually into view. 
Here is an example from personal experience. I’m 
teaching Lujan, an important standing case, in 
Constitutional Law. The test for Article III standing has two 
causation elements.20 Causation is something that my 
students have already covered extensively last semester in 
Torts. In questioning students about the facts of the case, it 
becomes clear to me (how? by what means?) that my students 
don’t know how to tell a convincing causation story—that is, 
they do not know how to select and shape the facts to build a 
persuasive story in which X causes (or fails to cause) Y. The 
ability to construct and relate such stories is, in my 
judgment, a critical lawyering skill. Do I: (a) ignore the 
problem, because teaching causation isn’t part of the 
Constitutional Law curriculum, and they should have 
 
 20. A typical formulation is: “A plaintiff must allege [1] personal injury [2] 
fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and [3] likely to be 
redressed by the requested relief.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
Elements 2 and 3 require a causation analysis. 
2021] TRANSMISSION OF MASTERY 69 
already learned it; (b) continue without addressing the 
problem because the costs to my coverage goals will exceed 
the benefits to the students; or (c) stop the class, ditch my 
lesson plan, and teach the subject because they need to know 
it if they are to master the craft of lawyering? 
What would Mark Hopkins do on his log? I believe he 
would throw out his lesson plan, which is what I almost 
always do in these circumstances. Is that bad teaching? It is 
not.  
10 
Of what, then, does masterful transmission of mastery 
consist? I contend it comprises two essential elements: (1) 
sound, perceptive diagnosis of the problems a novice faces at 
some particular moment, and (2) administration of a 
thoughtful and carefully tailored cure for those problems. 
Neither the problems nor the most effective cures can always 
be predicted in advance.21 
My father is a retired music teacher, and a bit of a legend 
among his former students. He can teach any instrument, 
but his specialty is strings. In his retirement, he has taken 
on the role of consultant to some of his former students who 
are now themselves string teachers. They bring him their 
most challenging problems. He diagnoses these problems, 
and then devotes considerable time to writing short, original 
compositions designed to mount a direct attack on the 
student’s weakness. On one occasion, for example, he 
diagnosed a student’s problem as insufficient independence 
of the fingers of the left hand. To treat this problem, he wrote 
a composition—not a dull, repetitive exercise, but a coherent, 
albeit simple piece of music of the kind that a child might 
 
 21. It is possible of course that periodically circumstances align in a way that 
makes it easy to predict the problems incoming students will appear with, as well 
as the best treatment for those problems. At other times, though—for example, 
as one cohort is replaced by another with different characteristics—predictability 
may decline, perhaps greatly. Thus, the ability to predict student problems and 
identify “best practices” to treat them is variable, local, and entirely contextual.  
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actually wish to master—that required the student 
periodically to play broken thirds, a figure that can be played 
only when the fingers of the left hand operate with a great 
degree of independence. Mark Hopkins, I am certain, would 
have approved. 
11 
One of the great objections leveled by the assessment 
movement at the conception of transmission of mastery I 
have just sketched is its variability. Different students, it is 
claimed, performing equivalently, will nevertheless be 
evaluated differently by different masters, or even by the 
same master at different times. This is said to show the 
“subjectivity”—a concept used in this context pejoratively—
of traditional methods of transmission of mastery22—the 
Mark Hopkins method, let us call it. Suppose the charge is 
true: evaluation of students is subjective and variable. Does 
this demonstrate a defect in the Mark Hopkins model? It 
does not. 
As explained earlier, mastery is not a steady state. First 
and foremost, masters are human. Second, true mastery 
itself inevitably evolves as the master himself continues to 
acquire new knowledge and experiences—mastery is a 
journey, not a destination—so that different students who 
appear before the master at different times will inevitably 
receive slightly different instruction and slightly different 
evaluation by slightly different criteria. The more pertinent 
question is whether variability in assessment from student 
to student during essentially the same period impugns the 
master’s claim to be able successfully to judge the 
performance of novices. Yet is there any alternative? No 
human being can apply precisely the same standards in 
 
 22. See, e.g., MARY E. MCDONALD, SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LEARNING 
OUTCOMES: DEVELOPING MULTIPLE-CHOICE EXAMS 10 (2002); Jessica Clark & 
Christy DeSanctis, Toward a Unified Grading Vocabulary: Using Rubrics in 
Legal Writing Courses, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC 3, 3 (2013). 
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precisely the same way in every set of circumstances, over 
and over and over again. 
The great cure for this problem of human inconsistency, 
according to what appears to be a theory with many 
adherents among professional educators, is the rubric—a 
standard metric which the teacher produces and proceeds to 
apply mechanically—and thus, it is maintained, 
impartially—to the work of each and every student.23 This is 
a foul lie. I confess that, in occasional moments of doubt 
about my own ability to evaluate student work consistently, 
I have developed and administered rubrics. Here is what I 
always find: when I use a rubric, I cheat—constantly. It will 
often happen like this. I read an exam answer. The author 
has checked many or even all of the pre-programmed boxes—
spotted the issue, deployed the correct test, noticed and 
addressed a key fact, and so forth. Yet, on scoring the exam, 
I am troubled: the execution is poor, say, revealing that the 
student does not really—not really—know what he or she is 
doing. That is, I cannot say with any degree of comfort that 
the student’s answer proceeds from actual mastery, from 
mere dumb luck, or from some combination. At the same 
time, another student has done a masterful job of addressing 
a portion of the problem, but failed to address, or to address 
adequately, other issues I have identified in my rubric and to 
which I have assigned point totals.  
There is only one way to handle this: I cheat. I find a way 
to take points off the bad exam in some category of my rubric 
just because the exam is bad; and to give points to the good 
exam, just because it is good. I find myself inventing “bonus 
points” that I had not previously planned to award. I fully 
believe, moreover, that instructors who do not cheat in this 
 
 23. See Clark & DeSanctis, supra note 22; BARBARA E. WALVOORD & VIRGINIA 
JOHNSON ANDERSON, EFFECTIVE GRADING: A TOOL FOR LEARNING AND ASSESSMENT 
IN COLLEGE 40, 42–44 (2d ed. 2010); see also DANELLE D. STEVENS & ANTONIA LEVI, 
INTRODUCTION TO RUBRICS 4 (2005) (“One sure sign [you need a rubric] is if . . . 
[y]ou have graded all your papers and worry that the last ones were graded 
slightly differently from the first ones.”). 
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way—who stick fanatically to the rubric in the belief that it 
forces them to be fair in ways of which they are otherwise 
incapable—do so only by willfully ignoring what their own 
professional judgment tells them is true. 
The real question, then, isn’t whether judgment can be 
made invariable—it cannot—but how to deal with questions 
raised by the mass production of education. This is the real 
point of the “assessment movement,” a subject to which I 
shall return. The “problem” here has little to do with 
education; it has only to do with how to resolve tradeoffs 
required by its mass production—and by the suspicion of 
outsiders arising from the insularity of any practice.  
12 
One frequently employed response to these problems is 
to give an “objective” exam—a multiple choice exam, say.24 
The scoring of such an exam is automatic, depriving the 
teacher of any and all discretion; indeed, the scoring can be 
outsourced to a machine, guaranteeing its consistency and 
thus impartiality.25 The scoring, moreover, is transparent, 
and thus is easily explained to outsiders who may be 
suspicious of the subjectivity of the master’s methods of 
evaluation and the self-referential character of their 
disciplinary validation.  
But such an exam is not any less “subjective” or even 
“variable” than an essay, oral, or performance exam—the 
subjectivity and variability simply occur on a longer time 
scale. A multiple choice test given one year may demand 
different answers or performances than one given the next 
year. All that is different is that the “subjectivity” and 
potential “variability” occur only once, at the time the test is 
made, rather than occurring repeatedly with each student. 
But if each student is subject to exactly the same standard of 
 
 24. See MCDONALD, supra note 22, at 67. A multiple choice exam is “objective,” 
on this view, because “subjective judgment is not involved in scoring them.” Id. 
 25. This is said to be an aspect of a test’s “reliability.” Id. at 152. 
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judgment of mastery, it does not follow that the quality of the 
judgment is better. The test itself might be badly flawed, so 
that every student is judged equivalently and impartially by 
a flawed, and thus meaningless, standard. It is far from 
certain that all masters would even agree on which is the 
best answer to all the questions asked. This is precisely why 
I never assign commercially prepared study aids to my first-
year students; sometimes I disagree with the analyses 
provided by the authors. 
If in contrast the master had given each student 
individually a lengthy oral examination, the master’s 
judgment might have varied from day to day and from 
student to student, but all students would have received an 
evaluation that was fundamentally sound, even if not 
precisely identical—an important distinction that seems to 
be widely ignored in the educational literature. A multiple 
choice test is therefore more consistent, but not necessarily 
better. Again, Exhibit A is the bar exam itself, which no 
doubt is applied consistently from taker to taker, but has 
achieved this consistency only at the cost of sacrificing 
evaluation of any skills that are actually relevant to the 
successful practice of law. Moreover, the construction of a 
test like the bar exam requires a special skill that is 
generally completely divorced from the kind of mastery that 
the master claims, and in which he instructs, and in the 
acquisition of which it is far from clear he should invest. 
All this goes a long way toward demonstrating why the 
best way to evaluate students is (1) by consensus (2) over a 
long period of time. Since mastery itself can most reliably be 
identified and acknowledged by consensus among experts 
employing the conventions of their field, the same is true of 
evaluating the performance of novices. Thus, the overall 
judgment of an entire faculty over the course of a student’s 
academic career, expressed in a transcript, is by far the best 
way to provide an accurate evaluation of the student’s level 
of mastery. I am always concerned when students who, on 
the basis of their class performance, I think well of then do 
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poorly on my exam. But I am much more concerned when 
students who are, by consensus of my colleagues, excellent 
students do poorly on my exams.  
I am inclined to think, moreover, that when students are 
subjected to the judgment of many masters over long periods 
of time, it matters very little what method or standards of 
evaluation are used—everything will even out in the long 
run; the student’s progress will be accurately gauged. 
Indeed, over decades of experimentation with different forms 
of examination and evaluation, I have found exactly this: 
regardless of the format, the students almost invariably 
manage to distribute themselves normally, with the best 
students at the top and the worst at the bottom. And at the 
end of the day, if the collective judgment of an entire faculty 
of masters will not suffice to judge accurately a student’s 
acquisition of mastery, then nothing will. 
TEACHING 
13 
To this point, I have simply assumed that masters teach, 
and that they do so masterfully, but I want now to introduce 
a complication. What, precisely, is good teaching a 
demonstration of? What kind of mastery does it display? I see 
four possibilities. 
First good teaching might be an inherent aspect of 
mastery itself. That is, mastery of a practice includes by 
hypothesis mastery of the practice of reproducing mastery. 
Consequently, all masters can teach. 
Second, good teaching might demonstrate a kind of 
specialized mastery, though a kind that still falls within the 
practice domain mastered. In this case, some but not all 
masters can teach; one can practice mastery without being 
able effectively to replicate it. 
A third possibility is that good teaching demonstrates a 
kind of superior mastery of the relevant domain. Thus, all 
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true masters can teach, and teaching is something reserved 
for the best of the best. This is, I suspect, how many 
university professors conceive of teaching, and why they are 
so often concerned with educational pedigree, the theory 
evidently being that graduation from, say, an Ivy League 
dojo, rather than one maintained by a state university, 
validates a claim of superior mastery. 
Finally, good teaching might demonstrate a distinct 
mastery of a wholly different domain—the domain of 
teaching—in addition to mastery of the domain in which 
instruction is given. Mastery in this case does not imply 
replication; to transmit mastery to others, the master must 
learn, and ultimately achieve mastery of, a different domain. 
This is the claim made by education “specialists,” a class of 
individuals, produced mainly by university schools of 
education, who proclaim themselves masters of “teaching” 
tout court—that is, teaching divorced from any particular 
field of mastery that they purport to transmit. 
14 
What, if anything, does the achievement of mastery 
teach the master about teaching mastery? In a sense, not 
much. The master of course knows how he himself acquired 
mastery. But surely there are many different paths to 
mastery, in part because studying under different masters 
may require treading different paths, but also because 
individual differences from student to student may mean 
simply that no two novices follow precisely the same path to 
mastery even when they study side by side under the same 
master. Consequently, it is possible that a master’s ability to 
lead another along precisely the path to mastery that he 
himself has trod may be of limited value. 
But is that the only kind of knowledge of the route to 
mastery that the achievement of mastery confers? Perhaps 
not. The achievement of any kind of mastery necessarily 
entails knowledge of what it means to understand something 
fully. Such knowledge is rare; few people achieve mastery of 
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anything, and thus have never known the sensation—for 
that is what it is, a sensation—of profound understanding. 
Perhaps this kind of knowledge—an understanding of 
understanding—by itself equips the master to teach others 
because it puts him in a position to recognize the presence or 
absence of true understanding in others. Every master 
knows his own path to mastery, but assuming he is not 
entirely without imagination, surely he can imagine, at least 
within limits, how the path might be altered to suit another. 
Furthermore, the achievement of mastery may 
inherently require great skill at learning itself, and self-
directed learning, at that. As a result, masters may be able 
to master other domains more easily than those who have 
never achieved mastery in any domain. Suppose, then, that 
successful teaching of a practice that one has mastered 
requires learning either a new aspect of the mastered 
domain, or even an entirely distinct domain—the domain of 
teaching. In those cases, perhaps masters may be able to 
learn to teach their own subject—perhaps nearly any 
subject—very quickly, and then go on learning, again 
relatively quickly, to teach it well.  
These appear to be assumptions made almost 
universally in educational institutions. Law schools in 
particular seem to take the view that virtually any faculty 
member can teach virtually any course. As a first-year law 
student, I had the pleasure of taking Contracts from Antonin 
Scalia, who was an entertaining and jocular teacher, but his 
primary field of expertise was administrative law, and in 
retrospect, I doubt he knew much at all about contracts. The 
law school administration, however, seemed to think that 
any teacher who was good at teaching his own subject would 
be good enough at teaching any other subject, at least in the 
first-year curriculum.  
This is probably true, but for different reasons, I suspect, 
from those that lay behind the decision of the University of 
Chicago Law School to assign Professor Scalia to teach 
Contracts. The dirty little secret is that when professors take 
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on new courses, they actually teach the same course they 
have always taught, though the students don’t know it. I’m 
sure students who have taken Constitutional Law from me 
believe they have had a different course from those who have 
taken my Civil Procedure course. But I know otherwise; the 
courses are identical in the ways that really matter.  
15 
When masters endeavor to transmit their mastery, they 
generally get better at it with practice and experience. What 
should we make of that? 
I have suggested that true teaching, of the kind that 
counts as transmission of mastery, consists essentially of two 
elements: diagnosis and treatment. As masters gain 
experience, surely their diagnostic skills improve. 
Eventually, they’ve seen it all before, or much of it. Patterns 
emerge in student difficulties, and the master begins to sense 
the patterns. Similarly, as the master gains experience 
administering treatments, he becomes more adept at 
choosing and administering them. 
Of course, the dominant patterns of diagnosis and 
treatment can and do change over time. As any experienced 
teacher knows, different student cohorts arrive with 
different kinds of problems. As a result, the content and 
methods of successful transmission of mastery are never 
static. Still, experience helps—but experience doing what? 
I contend that what experience in the transmission of 
mastery confers upon masters is simply this: more 
experience with trial and error, and indeed that masterful 
teaching is neither more nor less than that—the continual 
deployment of trial and error for the purpose of moving 
novices toward mastery.  
This explains why only a master can transmit mastery. 
Anyone stuck in front of a classroom can use trial and error 
to teach, but a master’s trial and error is informed—by 
domain-specific mastery itself, and by the judgment and 
78 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69 
experience that accompany it. Indeed, a master who fails 
constantly to employ methods of trial and error becomes 
stale, and mastery that is static decays. Thus, the apogee of 
good teaching is precisely informed, experienced trial and 
error tailored to the immediate needs of individual 
students—Mark Hopkins on a log. 
16 
But what about masters who teach badly? What does this 
phenomenon tell us about the transmission of mastery? In 
particular, does bad teaching impugn a master’s claim to 
mastery?  
If mastery of a subject necessarily embraces the capacity 
to teach it, then of course bad teaching impugns the bad 
teacher’s claim to mastery. But it seems to me dubious that 
mastery of a practice necessarily implies a fortiori to any 
great extent mastery of its replication. On the other hand, if 
mastery implies an advanced ability to learn how to transmit 
that mastery to others through teaching—which seems to me 
quite plausible—what then does persistently bad teaching 
over many years imply?  
One possibility, clearly, is a lack of underlying mastery.26 
Among teachers of writing it is widely accepted that the most 
common cause of bad writing is bad thinking. On the same 
principle, a possible cause of bad teaching—teaching that is 
confusing or disorganized—is simply thinking that is 
correspondingly confused or disorganized, a condition largely 
incompatible with a plausible claim to mastery. Yet I think 
this situation is probably quite rare. 
 A more common explanation, it seems to me, is that 
some masters—a very small number, I believe—either lack 
interest altogether in developing their skill as teachers of 
 
 26. See Gary Shaw, A Heretical View of Teaching: A Contrarian Looks at 
Teaching, the Carnegie Report, and Best Practices, 28 TOURO L. REV. 1239 (2012) 
(attributing criticism of the Socratic method to incompetent use of that method 
by poor teachers). 
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and mentors to novices or, more likely, don’t care to invest 
their effort in transmitting their mastery to every student 
who appears on their doorstep. Some masters, for example, 
may wish to train only the best and most promising students. 
Such a choice raises two questions. First, do masters 
have an obligation to train all students? In traditional 
systems of apprenticeship, masters were not obliged to train 
all comers; they could select their own apprentices based on 
whatever criteria they chose to apply. Some masters, we may 
assume, chose to accept only the most promising and highly 
motivated students. In the modern university (assuming it 
to be a place populated by masters), the obligations of 
mastery are different: virtually all faculty must teach 
whatever students the university deems eligible to register 
for their courses, and the expectation is that masters will 
devote an appropriate amount of effort to all students, 
whatever their aptitude. 
Second, if the obligations of mastery do include 
mentoring all students diligently, does the failure to do so 
impugn the master’s claim to mastery? I believe it does to a 
certain extent insofar as a master who refuses to fulfill this 
obligation displays what I consider a lack of self-mastery; he 
is unable to force himself to fulfill his obligations as a master. 
Can one who lacks self-mastery nevertheless plausibly claim 
mastery of his practice? I am dubious; self-mastery seems to 
me a fundamental prerequisite to the achievement of 
genuine mastery.  
Many years ago, I studied taekwondo at a pioneering 
dojo in Washington, D.C. The students were of all ages, and 
some of the younger students wanted to be instructed in the 
use of weapons. In that dojo, the study of weapons was 
forbidden until a student had attained the degree of black 
belt. The head instructor explained it in this way: “A weapon 
is merely an extension of your body. Until you have mastered 
your own body, you cannot possibly master the use of a 
weapon. A black belt recognizes mastery of the body, so you 
cannot study weapons until you earn your black belt.” I am 
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inclined to think this reasoning relevant to any kind of 
mastery: mastery of the self is a precondition to mastery of a 
practice—any practice.27 Thus, masters who choose 
deliberately not to cultivate and then to exercise their 
teaching skills in challenging situations—if such creatures 
exist—display, in my view, a lack of self-mastery that calls 
into question to some degree their underlying mastery.  
17 
Is there such a thing as mastery of teaching, as distinct 
from mastery of teaching something? This appears to be the 
claim made by schools of education that train primary and 
secondary school teachers.28 Indeed, it appears to be the 
claim made almost universally by state regulators. For the 
most part, one cannot be licensed to teach at a public school 
by producing a degree showing mastery of a subject that 
teachers teach in schools—an advanced degree in history, for 
example, or mathematics. Instead, one must produce two 
things: a bachelor’s degree—by no means a demonstration of 
domain-specific mastery—and a credential from a school or 
department of education, a credential that appears to claim 
that its holder is a master simply of “teaching.”29  
 
 27. See generally JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, THE DEATH OF CHARACTER: MORAL 
EDUCATION IN AN AGE WITHOUT GOOD OR EVIL 16, 56 (2000). 
 28. For example, the Harvard Graduate School of Education describes itself 
as “an impact-focused professional school that is working to improve 
opportunities and outcomes for all learners.” HARV. GRADUATE SCH. of EDUC., 
https://www.gse.harvard.edu/about. The Stanford Graduate School of Education 
is dedicated to achieving effective learning for all. STAN. GRADUATE SCH. of EDUC., 
https://ed.stanford.edu/about. Graduates of the University of Wisconsin School of 
Education are committed to high-quality, culturally responsive instruction that 
serves every student. UNIV. of WISCONSIN SCH. of EDUC., 
https://tec.education.wisc.edu/become-a-teacher/. Its courses “will prepare you to 
be a competent, critically reflective educator.” UNIV. of WISCONSIN SCH. of EDUC., 
supra. 
 29. For example, to be certified as a teacher in California, one must hold a 
bachelor’s degree and complete an approved “teacher preparation program. Such 
a program contains educational curriculum.” ALL EDUC. SCHS., 
https://www.alleducationschools.com/teacher-certification/california/. 
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If teaching in primary and secondary schools is meant to 
produce the transmission of mastery, then the present 
credentialing system is fatally flawed since it does not 
require teachers to be masters of the practices in which they 
instruct students. There is, however, another possibility: 
primary and secondary schools are not, nor are they intended 
to be, venues for the transmission and acquisition of mastery. 
Instead, they are meant to be venues for the transmission 
and acquisition of basic competence. If so, then the main 
qualification for a faculty position in such a school is simply 
to be an adult in possession of basic competence. It is 
presumably in this context that a degree in “teaching,” 
rather than in teaching a specific practice or domain, is 
claimed to have meaning.  
Is it meaningful? Perhaps. Masters devote significant 
time, effort, and excruciatingly close attention to the 
acquisition and cultivation of mastery. Perhaps the 
acquisition of basic competence is different. Its possessors 
may not know how they acquired it, or even when. Having 
had no particular need to reflect upon their own basic 
competence, they may lack a clear idea of in what it consists. 
Having never been part of a system created deliberately to 
replicate a very high level of competence, they may be largely 
unacquainted with the means by which facility in a practice 
is transmitted.  
It is perhaps in these circumstances that the kind of 
instruction offered in schools of education may be useful, 
along with standardized teaching aids such as textbooks, 
commercially produced lesson plans, rubrics, off-the-shelf 




All educators, at every level, whatever their prior 
experience, and whether they like it or not, now inhabit the 
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Empire of Assessment. In this vast realm, Mark Hopkins and 
his log are out. In his place is a regime of constant 
assessment, both of student learning and institutional 
success, in which the instruments of assessment must 
produce results that are susceptible to counting, a practice 
that is considered the exclusive source of objective evidence 
of achievement.30 Dimensions of achievement not susceptible 
to evaluation by counting are deemed excessively subjective 
and are exiled.  
The ascendance of the Empire of Assessment results 
from the confluence of several trends. One is a vague 
suspicion, to which I alluded earlier, understandable in a 
democratic society, about the closed, self-referential nature 
of mastery.31 Another is a perfectly understandable concern 
with public finances and an accompanying worry about 
whether the public is getting adequate value from its 
investment in public education.32 But by and large, the main 
reason for the rapid victory and expansion of the Empire of 
Assessment is the equally rapid emergence and consolidation 
of a social commitment to specialize (as it were) in the mass 
production of basic competence, in all domains.  
 
 30. E.g., Lee. S. Shulman, Counting and Recounting: Assessment and the 
Quest for Accountability, 39 CHANGE: THE MAG. OF HIGHER LEARNING 20, 24 
(2007). 
 31. See generally, Alfred S. Konefsky & Barry Sullivan, In This, the Winter of 
our Discontent: Legal Practice, Legal Education, and the Culture of Distrust, 62 
BUFF. L. REV. 659, 738 (2014). Perhaps the quintessential expression of such a 
view is the 1995 antitrust lawsuit filed by the U.S. Department of Justice against 
the American Bar Association charging that “‘legal educators have captured the 
ABA’s law school accreditation process.’” BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW 
SCHOOLS 11 (Chicago Series in L. and Soc’y 2012) (quoting from the District Court 
opinion). For a delightful critique of this critique, see Steven Hales, Who’s 
Assessing the Assessors’ Assessors?, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 11, 2013), 
https://www.chronicle.com/article/whos-assessing-the-assessors-assessors/.  
 32. See CHRIS W. GALLAGHER, RECLAIMING ASSESSMENT: A BETTER 
ALTERNATIVE TO THE ACCOUNTABILITY AGENDA 19-28 (Heinemann 2007); MICHAEL 
F. MIDDAUGH, PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION: 
DEMONSTRATING INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 109–32 (Jossey-Bass 2010); 
GREGORY S. MUNRO, OUTCOMES ASSESSMENT FOR LAW SCHOOLS 19–21 (Instit. for 
L. Sch. Teaching 2000). 
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We see this commitment in, for example, the recently 
discovered truth that everyone must have a university 
education,33 and indeed that a university education is a 
human right.34 We see it also in the extremely successful 
efforts by the business community to shift the costs of job 
training from economic actors to the system of higher 
education, where the bill for training future workers in basic 
employability is paid by the public. Firms thus unnecessarily 
raise their credentialing requirements for entry-level jobs to 
include a university degree, creating a system in which 
university graduates are de facto unable to enter the world 
of work unless universities provide the training in basic 
employment competence that employers once understood to 
be their own responsibility.35 
Even in law, which, like other professions, was long 
considered a practice demanding mastery rather than basic 
competence, a move to mass training in basic competence is 
openly advocated by enthusiasts of artificial intelligence and 
automated, do-it-yourself enterprises like Legal Zoom. 
According to these prognosticators, whom I have no good 
reason to doubt, the future of the profession is one of two 
tiers: “bespoke” work for those who can pay and who have a 




 33. President Obama was a strong advocate of this idea. See Doug Lederman 
& Paul Fain, The Higher Education President, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 19, 2017), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/01/19/assessing-president-obamas-
far-reaching-impact-higher-education. 
 34. See Heidi R. Gilchrist, Higher Education. as a Human Right, 17 WASH. U. 
GLOBAL STUDIES L. REV. 645, 647 (2018). 
 35. See Doug Lederman, Credential Creep Confirmed, INSIDE HIGHER ED 
(Sept. 9, 2014), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/09/09/demand-
degrees-grows-many-fields-havent-required-them.  
 36. See BENJAMIN H. BARTON, GLASS HALF-FULL: THE DECLINE AND REBIRTH 
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 6–9, 85–103 (Oxford Univ. Press 2015). 
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Where, then, does that leave us? It appears to leave us 
with a system in which basically competent people transmit 
basic competence. Mastery is dropped as superfluous, or 
perhaps is reclassified as a luxury item restricted to those 
who can pay for it.  
Because mastery is no longer its goal, the education 
industry devotes ever-increasing effort to figuring out how to 
make the mass transmission of basic competence more cost-
efficient—through distance learning,37 for example, or 
MOOCs.38 Or through the cheap assembly of a faculty of 
permanent, itinerant adjuncts,39 because a permanent 
faculty of masters has an obstreperous habit of wanting to 
transmit what it knows as though it had some kind of value. 
Or by dismantling the very idea of a “faculty” as an 
institution, much less as one charged with designing and 
implementing a curriculum.40 And if these innovations not 
only de-institutionalize the transmission of mastery but also, 
as a collateral consequence, dumb down even prevailing 
conceptions of what counts as basic competence, at least the 
result, however characterized, is delivered at a reasonable 
price. 
Where does all this leave the community of self-
proclaimed and self-validating masters? As my colleague 
Jack Schlegel, struggling with the same questions, has put 
it, perhaps all such a community can do is to “dress for 
dinner”—that is, to maintain with dignity its quaint and 
 
 37. See STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROC. FOR APPROVAL OF L. SCHS. § 306 (AM. 
BAR. ASS’N 2019). 
 38. A MOOC is a “massive open online course.” See, e.g., Laura Pappano, The 
Year of the MOOC, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/11/04/education/edlife/massive-open-online-courses-are-multiplying-at-a-
rapid-pace.html.  
 39. FRANK DONOGHUE, THE LAST PROFESSORS: THE CORPORATE UNIVERSITY 
AND THE FATE OF THE HUMANITIES 56–60 (Fordham Univ. Press 2008). 
 40. Id. at 55–83. 
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obsolete rituals and practices until the masters and 
practitioners comprising the community are no longer able; 
until, that is, we complete the transition to a post-Sisyphean 
world in which “gravity gets not just the rock but also the 
pusher.”41 
 
 41. John Henry Schlegel, To Dress for Dinner: Teaching Law in a 
Bureaucratic Age, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 435, 479 (2018). 
